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• ABSTRACT: The paper addresses the internal structure of layers at the Representational
level in Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG), and proposes three adaptations of the
representation of frames with respect to what is now standing practice (HENGEVELD;
MACKENZIE, 2006; Forthcoming). Our main concern is a reappraisal of Dik’s (1989, 1997)
original argumentation for the endocentric use of argument variables within restrictors of
terms, which we argue are fundamental to FDG theory and should be generalised over all
representational layers. Based on this view, we propose a transparent usage of square
brackets, which embrace equipollent configurations of which the argument variable is
part. This in turn reveals problems in the representation of the nuclear event description –
the verb and its arguments – as an identifiable entity, which is an old problem in FG, as
well as in the representation of reference modification. As a unified solution, we invoke
exocentric layers to account for the special structural properties of these units. The result
is a more consistent and transparent structure of representational frames in FDG.
• KEYWORDS: Representational level; Functional Discourse Grammar formalism; restriction;
predication.
1 Introduction: Layered structure in FDG
In recent years, the Theory of Functional Grammar (DIK, 1978; 1987, 1997)
has been thoroughly revised so to be able to describe discourse in terms of the
interaction between pragmatic, semantic, morpho-syntactic and phonological
modules. In its overall conception, Functional Grammar (FG) was designed so
that pragmatic considerations take precedence over semantic ones, which again
come before morphosyntactic and phonological encoding. However, in FG
pragmatic, semantic and syntactic aspects of a linguistic form were all described
1 UvA – Universiteit van Amsterdam – Amsterdam Centre for Language and Communication – Spuistraat 210 –
NL-1012 VT  – Amsterdam – The Netherlands. E.mail address: n.smit@uva.nl
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in a single representational structure. This meant that for instance denotational
aspects and aspects of use had to be accounted for in a single representation,
which obscured the different possible uses to which particular denotations may
be put. In Functional Discourse Grammar (HENGEVELD; MACKENZIE, 2006;
Forthcoming), these different mapping possibilities are now accounted for as the
interaction between modules. The result is that the outer layers of FG’s Underlying
Clause Structure are relocated at the pragmatically driven interpersonal level.
The formal representations (HENGEVELD; MACKENZIE, 2006) have,
however, remained faithful to the LAYERED STRUCTURE OF THE CLAUSE (henceforth
LSC).3 First put forward in Hengeveld (1989) and incorporated into FG (DIK,
1997), this algorithm proposes the following unified analysis for all layers
(HENGEVELD; MACKENZIE, 2006, p.671):
(1) (π α1: [(complex) head] (α1): σ (α1))ϕ
In what follows, we will concentrate exclusively on the representational level,
but this algorithm is used also to form interpersonal units of different detail and
complexity.
It is important to realise that, in order to do so, the LSC relies on two
fundamentally different structural configurations in which the constituent
elements that determine the denotation of the overall layer can be combined:
HIERARCHICAL and EQUIPOLLENT configurations. Although implicit in earlier FG,
in FDG they are formally characterised for the first time. In section 2 below we
discuss these configurations in detail, since their characterisation has
consequences for the way the underlying representations are formalised.
Functional Discourse Grammar has also remained faithful to the way
restrictors are represented in terms of open predications. In the earliest FG,
restriction was limited to the denotation of individuals, but in FDG this has
been generalised to all entity types. The algorithm in (1) shows α1 is described
in terms of one or more predications in which it is the argument of the predicate
that further specifies its identity. However, the entity variable in these open
predications has over time lost much of its status as an argument of a predicate.
Arguments to drop the variable for principled reasons did not make it into the
recent proposals for an FDG, but in actual use the variable is often reduced to a
scope marker rather than an argument.
In this paper we address the status of this ‘closing variable’ in an attempt to
come to a more consistent representation of denotational content in FDG. This
3 The LSC was designed specifically for the Underlying Clause Structure in FG, which was predominantly
oriented towards representational semantics. In FDG, the same algorithm is used to derive structures at the
interpersonal level (and arguably, the morphosyntactic level) as well.
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involves a reassessment of the use of brackets, a reconsideration of the status of
the nuclear predication as well as the modification possibilities of properties,
and the formalisation of exocentric in addition to endocentric layers in FDG.
2 Hierarchical and equipollent configurations
The defining characteristic of hierarchical configurations is that their
constituent elements together form a single LAYER, i.e. a structure to which
integral reference can be made.4 It is hierarchical in the sense that when reference
is made to this single layer, the denotations of all constituent elements are by
necessity included. Layers are delineated by round brackets ( ) in the
representations.
The most important hierarchical operation employed in the LSC is
RESTRICTION, represented by the colon (:). Restriction is used to obtain a sufficient
degree of identifiability for an ENTITY (i) of a certain TYPE (α).
5 The type-tagged
entity αi can be conceived of as having at the outset a heavily underspecified
inherent denotation, i.e. as defining a large set of potential denotations. This set
would normally be too large to be useful in successfully identifying a referent,
and therefore it is typically restricted through the specification of additional
features of the entity.6 Restriction then results in a subset of entities that have
all the properties specified by the superset, enriched with the property that
defines the subset. Thus, while the extension of a hierarchical configuration
decreases, its denotation increases. This procedure can be applied recursively,
so that sub-subsets, sub-sub-subsets etc. are formed. The constructs declaring
subsets are called restrictors, the internal constitution of which is discussed in
section 5.
The primary restrictor is generally considered to be of special importance. It
typically determines the entity type and it also brings about the largest degree
of restriction (JESPERSEN, 1924, p.108). In the LSC, it is called the HEAD. Non-
primary restrictors, which subsequently serve to define further subsets, are called
4 Referentiality as we use it here is not the same as a Subact of Reference, which is an interpersonal decision
by a speaker to evoke a certain piece of denotation to a certain end. Rather, one could say that
(representational) referentiality, i.e. the ‘declaration’ of a denotational element, is a prerequisite for
(interpersonal) reference.
5 The subscript may also be taken as an index pointing to an address in the contextual component. Whether
the address and the entity that occupies the address should be distinguished or not is beyond the present
discussion. What is important to us is that the one-letter variable denotes essential ontological and
configurational properties of entities or classes of entities, rather than the entities themselves.
6 An alternative way of making denotations more specific is the use of an OPERATOR (π) designating non-relational,
auxiliary features of the entity (typically, semantic dimensions such as number, mood, aspect etc.). Operators
will not be considered in this paper.
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MODIFIERS (σ). It should be stressed that, configurationally speaking, heads and
modifiers are identical; they have the exact same relationship with their
immediate superset. The relation of restriction is represented by the colon. A
paraphrase of the general structure of layers in FDG as given in (1) is then ‘an
entity 1 of type α, such that HEAD applies to it, such that MODIFIER applies to it’.
Restrictors can either consist of lexical nuclei taken from the fund, or of other
representational entities, commanding their own layers with their own internal
complexity. This latter mechanism of layers-inside-layers ensures that recursion
has its place in the model as in (2) (HENGEVELD; MACKENZIE, 2006, p.674):
(2) (1 xi: (fi:boyN (fi)ϕ) (xi)ϕ)
‘a boy’
In (2), one specific entity i of type x is denoted, restricted by another entity i of
type f, the property boy; the overall representation can be paraphrased as ‘one
entity i of type x, such that an entity i of type f, such that boy applies to fi and fi
applies to xi’.
It should be noted that layers do not necessarily denote mental extensions
(i.e., ‘mental images’); rather, their key function is that they serve as phoric
domains. That is, it is conceivable that a speaker wants to refer to something
mentioned earlier that does not correspond to a ‘mental image’; in fact, this
happens regularly at the interpersonal, morphosyntactic and phonological levels,
as demonstrated in (3):
(3) That’s not how you pronounce ‘orangutan’
In (3), the anaphor that does not refer to the entity denoted, nor to the referential
Subact used to evoke it, but to the phonological form used in the original
speaker’s expression. The phoric domain in this case hence has no denotation,
but is a layer at the phonological level.
While hierarchical configurations form a single layer, this does not exclude
the possibility of making reference to its constituent layers in turn. This is
demonstrated in (4); the phoric elements used may be different for layers in
different positions in the LSC:7
7 Sources of the examples, all on 4 July and 1 October 2007:
• http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/988265.stm
• http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B7GWS-4KPX95P-H&_user=496085
&_coverDate=01%2F31%2F2007&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000024218
&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=496085&md5=0e4201be0cadff9ed7ad38ca459fe60e
• http://harmjobinhetwild.blogspot.com/2007_04_01_archive.html
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(4) a. The car that runs on air.
b. This reduction is much larger in the rich flame than in the lean one.
c. Het is nog niet bekend hoe de slachtoffers, een onbekend gebleven man en dito
vrouw, om het leven zijn gekomen.
‘It is yet unknown how the victims, an unidentifiedi man and Øi woman, perished.’
The anaphor that in (4a) refers to the individual (x) car; in (4b), the anaphor one
does not refer to the individual flame (indeed there are different flames at stake
here), but to the property (f) that is ascribed to this individual as its primary
restrictor; in (4c) likewise reference is to a property, but now the anaphor dito
‘ditto’ refers to the non-primary restrictor onbekend gebleven ‘unidentified’.
Layers are also scope domains, i.e. operators and modifiers have scope over
a particular layer in the representation, including all its constituent elements. In
this way, the layers account for the differences in scope of modifiers such as
beaming and terribly in (5a-b):
(5) a. A beaming, friendly priest
b. A terribly friendly priest
In (5a) the modifier beaming restricts the individual (x) on a par with the other
modifier, friendly and the head priest, while terribly in (5b) scopes over the
property (f) friendly only. In other words, the first example describes an individual
that is ‘priest’, ‘friendly’ and ‘beaming’, while the second describes an individual
that is ‘priest’ and ‘terribly friendly’. To account for the nesting of restrictors
both the individual and the modifying properties must form layers by themselves.
When units are combined non-hierarchically, no scope domains are formed
and reference is not possible to the configuration as a whole. Hengeveld and
Mackenzie (Forthcoming) call these configurations of elements of equal
importance EQUIPOLLENT, and square brackets are used to represent them. The
prototypical example of an equipollent configuration is formed by the predicate
and its arguments, as in (6), from Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006, p.674):8
(6) (Past ei: [(fi: readv (fi)) (1 xi: — boyN —)Ag (1 xj: — bookN —)Pat] (ei))
‘the boy read the book’
What (6) denotes is a past entity i of type e, restricted by the equipollent
configuration of fi, acting on xi and xj. These latter three units, however, do not
stand in a mutual relationship of restriction, nor are they otherwise in each
8 Hyphens are conventionally used to indicate the omission of further internal complexity; xi and xj in (6) have
the same internal structure as xi in (2).
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other’s scope. Rather, they interact ‘horizontally’, in such a way that their
compositional semantics is richer than the mere sum of the constituent layers,
because an interaction takes place between them.
Within the class of equipollent configurations, one further subdivision will
be made between PREDICATIONAL configurations of the format [(αi) (αj)ϕ], and
JUXTAPOSITIONAL configurations of the format [(αi) (αj)]. As these abstractions
make clear, the constituent units in a juxtapositional configuration are just
equipollent, with no explicit interaction being specified. Predicational
configurations, of which (6) is an example, consist of a unit with a relational
denotation, binding a number of other units as its arguments. These arguments
are marked for their FUNCTION in the interaction (ϕ), or more precisely, the quality
of their relation with the predicate. In many cases, this function will require no
specific qualification and can hence be ‘zero’ (represented as Ø). Note that we
use ‘predicate’, ‘predication’, ‘argument’ and the like as configurational notions
in this paper, i.e. referring to structural relations between units in a
representation. The representational construct usually referred to as the (nuclear)
predication, which denotes the interaction between a zero-order relation and
one or more participants, is just one instantiation of that configuration.
The distinction between hierarchical and equipollent configurations was
manifest in FG’s differential treatment of modifiers in the term,9 as in the
fascinating book, and modifiers of the (nuclear) predication, as in the boy read
the book in the library (DIK, 1997). The former are analysed as restrictors, while
the latter are SATELLITES, which enter into a predicational rather than a
hierarchical relationship with the layer they are used to modify. This opposition,
however, disappeared after Rijkhoff’s (1990; 2002) convincing demonstration of
strong parallels between term structure and clause structure. This led to two
proposals for unification of the two types of modifiers. Rijkhoff (1990) argues all
modifiers are satellites; Hengeveld (1989) and also Hengeveld and Mackenzie
(2006; Forthcoming) analyse all modification as restriction.
3 Square brackets
In the previous section, we said that in the FDG formalism hierarchical
relations were indicated by round brackets and equipollent relations by square
brackets. Both types of bracketing were used in FG, but to our knowledge they
have never been introduced explicitly, nor are they accounted for in the lists of
9 The notion ‘term’ as used by Dik (1978; 1989; 1997) is a conflation of the configurational notion argument, the
denotational notion individual, and the interpersonal notion referent. In the context of this paper, we are
referring to the denotational use of the notion. Within the FDG framework, ‘term’ is no longer used.
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‘abbreviations used in FG-representations’ in Dik’s work. Now that they are
explicitly characterised, however, some questions arise as to how they were
commonly used in representations before and whether they should be relocated.
In order to address this, we go back in history a little, to show how the square
brackets were used before.
In early work on FG, Dik (1978) uses square brackets to delineate the domain
over which satellites such as those with the semantic function Manner had
scope, which is the nuclear predication consisting of the verb and its
arguments.10 This relationship between satellite and nuclear predication, as was
pointed out above, he considers to be one of predication, and not restriction.
That is, in the example below, cautiously in Dik’s view does not specify a subset
of occurrences of Peter removing the lid from the jar (as friendly would do in the
set of priests in (5a)), but rather modifies the whole nuclear predication (cf. DIK,
1997, p.235-36):
(7) ei: [remove (Peter) (the lid) (from the jar)] (cautiously)Manner
‘Peter cautiously removed the lid from the jar’
The representation in (7) makes explicit that the part between square brackets,
while not commanding a variable, configurationally acts as a predicate with
respect to its Manner argument (i.e. ‘cautiously is how Peter removed the lid
from the jar’). In later work, Dik remains faithful to this use. As Dik (1997, p.227)
puts it, “cautiously specifies the way in which the three-place relation remove
was established between (Peter), (the lid) and (from the jar)”.
As mentioned earlier, Hengeveld and Mackenzie (Forthcoming) follow
Hengeveld (1989) and generalise term structure over all semantic types, with Dik’s
satellites in (7) being recast as restrictors. The square brackets are now used to
indicate that the argument variable ei in the restrictor is not itself an argument of
the verb. If we apply these changes to (7), the representation in (8) results:
(8) ei: [—remove (Peter) (the lid) (from the jar) —] (ei)Ø: (—cautiously—) (ei)Ø
However different these two conceptions of modification, it will be clear that
the relation between on the one hand the equipollent domain [remove (Peter)
(the lid) (from the jar)] and on the other cautiously in (7) and (ei) in (8) is structurally
identical. On both occasions, the bracketed material constitutes a configurational
domain, which predicates something over its argument, which in (8) is indeed
indicated by the semantic function on the argument variable (ei). However, this
10 In later publications manner adverbs would be analysed as predicate modifiers, rather than predication
modifiers.
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entails further equipollent relations in (8): between the nuclear predication and
(ei) in the first restrictor and between cautiously and (ei) in the second. And this
should also be captured by square brackets as in (9):
(9) ei: [[remove (Peter) (the lid) (from the jar)] (ei)Ø]: [(—cautiously—)Manner (ei)Ø]
The double occurrence of square brackets is caused by the presence of a
predicative unit that is in itself also an equipollent configuration.
Now, recall the structure of individual-denoting units according to Hengeveld
and Mackenzie (2006, p.674), as discussed in (2). In the light of the previous
discussion, they can now be rewritten as in (10):
(10) (1 xi: [(fi: [boyN (fi)Ø]) (xi)Ø])
This formalisation shows an interesting structural parallel between the nuclear
predication and (ei) in (9) and between boy and (fi) in (10): both form predications.
This parallel is absent in the formalisations provided in Hengeveld and Mackenzie
(2006, p.673).11 While they rely on two different abstract representational frames,
our more consistent bracketing shows that a single schema underlies both, the
difference between them being that the former is internally complex while the
latter is not.
While in itself a minor notational adjustment, our formalisation sheds new
light on two old issues in Functional Grammar: the question whether the nuclear
predication (and, by extension, the lexical head) serves as a phoric domain, and
should therefore command a variable of its own, and the status and necessity of
the argument variable as part of the restrictor.
4 A variable for the nuclear predication?
The status of the nuclear predication as a construct without its own variable
has been addressed by several authors. Cuvalay-Haak (1997) and Vet (1990), for
instance, have noted the descriptive problem in the representation of events
whereby the head of an event that typically consists of an equipollent predication
does not serve as a separate domain for anaphoric reference and hence does
not command a variable of its own. However, a considerable number of languages
have expression strategies that allow for phoric reference to nuclear predications,
showing that it must command a variable. Van Staden (In preparation) shows
11 It should be noted that the parallel between layers with complex and simplex heads has been noted by the
authors themselves as well, but that their way of bracketing does not capture this.
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that nuclear predications may be joined in serial verb constructions, for which
this layer is also required.
Hengeveld and Van Lier (Submitted), seeking to establish a unified analysis
of lexically specified and complex events, invoke an additional f-layer, which
contains the nuclear predication as its head, as exemplified in (11). In this way
the head of a complex event is of the same type – [(fi) (ei)Ø] – as the head of a
lexical event (12b):
(11) (ei: (fi: [ (fj: die (fj)) (xi: (fk: man (fk)) (xi): (fl: old (fl)) (xi))] (fi)) (ei))
‘The old man died’
(12) a. (ei: (fi: [—nuclear predication— ] (fi)) (ei)) complex event
b. (ei: (fi: [—lexeme— (fi)]) (ei)) lexical event
Note that the authors do not formalise the predicational configuration consisting
of fi and ei in the restrictor of ei. Using the formalisation proposed above in (10),
using square brackets to consistently embrace all equipollent relations, the
representation of lexical and complex events is as follows:
(13) a. (ei: [(fi: [—nuclear predication— (fi)ϕ]) (ei)ϕ]) complex event
b. (ei: [(fi: [—lexeme— (fi)ϕ]) (ei)ϕ]) lexical event
In both examples in (13), the ei in the restrictor is an argument of the predicate
formed by fi, which is restricted by a nuclear predication in (13a) and by a lexeme
in (13b).
Apart from unifying complex and lexical events, Hengeveld and Van Lier’s
fi-layer has the added advantage that it offers an opportunity to differentiate
between the scope of restrictors specifying the internal duration of an event,
and the scope of those that give information about its external position in a
wider set of occurrences.  Without going into the exact ontological nature of e-
type entities and quantified predications, it is vital that duration occurs within
the scope of location, and not the other way around (cf. TENNY, 2000 for a
discussion). When both types of modifiers were still located at the event layer,
this scope relation could not be accounted for, but with the introduction of this
added layer, it can.
It should be stressed that the fi-layer advocated by Hengeveld and Van Lier
does not correspond to the nuclear predication, but rather subsumes it as the
predicate of the first restrictor. This becomes clear when additional restrictors
occur, specifying internal duration. The fi layer thus does not correspond to the
nuclear predication, but to an augmented construct including duration modifiers,
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which we will call QUANTIFIABLE PREDICATION.12 In other words, notwithstanding
the merits of this new layer for other purposes, this leaves unsolved the problem of
the nuclear predication as a phoric domain. In view of the other established parallels
between them, we may hypothesise that the attested referentiality of the nuclear
predication as a complex head is mirrored in lexical heads. In order to pursue this
line of thought, we first examine the internal structure of restrictors in further detail.
5 The structure of restrictors
In section 2, restrictors were discussed without paying attention to their
internal constitution. It was stated that the relation between restrictors and
variable can be formalised as in (14):
(14) (xi:  HEAD : σ
1 : σ2 : ...)
‘an entity i of type x, such that HEAD, such that σ1, such that σ2, ...’
In the original conception of FG, each restrictor in a term x was thought of as an
open predication, meaning that it denotes ‘things that are the case’ about x.
Each restrictor takes the form of a predication that takes as its argument the x-
type entity i whose denotation it instantiates: ‘there is an xi such that xi has the
property fi’ (DIK, 1997, p.62). The repeated variable is thus part of the restrictor.
Since these restrictors are typically states, the semantic function of the argument
is typically zero.
It has also been noted in 2 that the formal operation of restriction is equivalent
to subset formation: the extension of the entity under construal is constrained by
predicating hierarchically ordered sets of properties of the entity. Trivially, in this
subset formation, every subset is contained in its superset; the relation between
them is ENDOCENTRIC. This is reflected in Dik’s notation of restrictors, which
accordingly are endocentric predications, crucially predicating properties over
an argument coreferential with their superset, rather than over some other entity.
In the case of multiple restrictors, they apply in order. A term like the old
white elephant in (15) thus denotes ‘there is a definite singular entity xi such
that the property ELEPHANT is predicated over xi, such that (furthermore) the
property WHITE is predicated over xi, such that (furthermore) the property OLD is
predicated over xi’:
(15) (d1 xi: [—elephant— (xi)Ø]: [—white— (xi)Ø]: [—old— (xi)Ø])
‘the old white elephant’
12 After Rijkhoff (2002).
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Restrictors need to be ordered to rule out the possibility that (17) is expressed
as *the elephantine old white (one); that is, Dik (1997, p.132 ff) follows Dahl
(1971) and argues that ordering of defining properties matters, and that
consequently, term instantiation is to be thought of as subset formation rather
than set intersection, as is generally claimed in formal semantic theories. The
interpretation of (15) is that there is a superset of individuals with the property
ELEPHANT, a subset of which is WHITE, and this subset of white elephants then
contains a subset of OLD white elephants. In other words, the entity ‘picks up’
increasingly more denotation as the subsets in which it is contained get smaller
yet more specific.
The formalisation of term structure as an ordered set of restrictors that take the
shape of endocentric predications is given in (16a) below. However, Dik (1997, p.63)
argues that in many cases the representation appears unnecessarily cumbersome,
since the restrictors are endocentric and therefore the argument variable is fully
predictable. Therefore, he proposes the simplified structure (16b), which has been
widely adopted in subsequent literature. Usually, if the argument variable was given
at all, its semantic function was omitted since it was always ‘zero’ (consider e.g. the
representations in Hengeveld and van Lier quoted in this paper):
(16) a. (xi: (fi) (xi)Ø)
b. (xi: (fi))
13
Note, however, that this is merely a notational simplification; the underlying
logic in the argumentation (at least, as far as Dik is concerned) remains unaltered.
In some of the publications in the new FDG framework, while retaining
FG’s notion of restriction, the function of the argument variable appears to be
reduced to that of a marker delimiting scope (HENGEVELD; VAN LIER,
submitted): “Note furthermore that the FDG formalism (at all levels of analysis)
makes use of a colon to represent a restriction operation, and a ‘closing variable’
between brackets at the end of each of these restriction operations, to mark off
its scope.” Such scope issues indeed occur, for instance when restrictors are
themselves further restricted, as in a terribly friendly priest. In such cases, we
need to make sure that independent reference is enabled to all constituent
elements separately, and to the complex property terribly friendly, but that terribly
does not have immediate scope over priest. However, the formalism already
commands means to capture this: the round brackets that delimit layers. Thus,
if their function is indeed reduced to scope marking, the argument variable
might as well be omitted altogether.
13 Note that Dik (1997) only uses square brackets to delimit nuclear predications, which is why they are absent
in this representation.
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Mackenzie (1987) argues that the proposal in (16a) should be abandoned in
favour of its simpler counterpart not for notational simplicity, but for principled
reasons. First, he argues that this representation of terms does not do justice to
the referential act that it carries out. Rather than assuming that a speaker carries
out a referential act of the form ‘there is an individual i such that i applies to f’,
a speaker in Mackenzie’s view simply puts ‘there is an i such that I tender f’. In
other words, Dik’s endocentric conception of term structure is replaced by an
EXOCENTRIC alternative in which the layer variable does no longer occur as an
argument in the restrictor. It follows that the formal relation between the
restrictor and the entity it is applied to is lost.
With the introduction of the Interpersonal Level in FDG and the principled
distinction between representational denotation and interpersonal evocation,
this is no longer an issue (cf. also fn. 9). Acts of reference are now a matter of the
interpersonal level, while the representational level describes the denotation.
At the level of the semantics, meanwhile, it would seem preferable to retain
Dik’s original formalism. Indeed if the formalism is (xi: fi), to be paraphrased
‘there is an xi such that fi’, and the defining characteristic of f-type units is their
applicability, one may well wonder what it is that fi applies to.
14 If the answer is
xi, we are back at square one.
A second problem with Dik’s account of term structure that Mackenzie points
to, is a strange obscurity in representational structure that arises when terms
are restricted by so-called β-relational predicates.15 Consider (17), in which xi,
government, takes an argument xj, China:
(17) (xi: —government— (xi) (xj: —China—))
‘the government of China’
According to this representation, both xi and xj are equal-ranking arguments of a
bivalent predicate government, which is obviously not in accordance with the intended
denotation. With the introduction of square brackets for the various predicational
configurations, the event variable ei, the property variable fj for the predication contained
in it, and fi for the predicate itself, the problem may be restated as follows:
(18) ei: [(fj: [(fi: —government—) (xj: —China—)Ref (fj)Ø]) (ei)Ø]
Now it is (xi) and (fj) that appear to be equal-ranking arguments of fi, government.
14 In Hengeveld’s (1989) analysis, the formalisation of term restriction is paraphrased as ‘an individual, such
that a property applies’, which also leaves the applicant implicit.
15 β-relational predicates are second-order entities that designate relationships between first-order entities;
α-relational predicates are zero-order entities that designate relationships. An exacter definition is given in
Mackenzie (1987; p.7).
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While Mackenzie (1987) confined the discussion to complex nominals, the
same problem in fact exists for their verbal counterparts:
(19) (ei: [(fj: [(fi: —govern—) (xj: —China—)A (xk: —Taiwan—)U (fj)Ø] (ei)Ø])
‘China governs Taiwan’
Here, we see ourselves confronted with the exact same problem; as soon as an
additional f-layer is added to enable referentiality of the predication contained
in the event, as proposed by Hengeveld and van Lier, the endocentric argument
variable of that layer causes scope ambiguity. Mackenzie’s proposal to omit
(rather than suppress) the variable argument does indeed solve this issue. But
the resulting formalism is somewhat incongruous with the argumentation
underlying it – it would denote ‘an individual i such that government of China’,
without stipulating the relation this description bears to the individual itself.
Also, this solution suggests that the problem was one of notation rather than
one of representation. We would therefore prefer to find a more principled
solution, whereby the argumentation behind the formalism may be retained
and which addresses what we believe to be the issue: the aforementioned
fundamental distinction between endocentric and exocentric layers. We address
this by first examining the representation of simple lexical heads, and then extend
our argument to the cases just discussed.
6 Modification of lexical heads
Let us first consider a case in which a first-order entity is restricted by two
predications:
(20) xi: [(fi: [priestN (fi)Ø]) (xi)Ø]: [(fj: [friendlyA (fj)Ø]) (xi)Ø]
‘a friendly priest’
In this case the individual i is restricted by two predications: xi is described as
‘being a priest’ and as ‘being friendly’. But what if the second restrictor does
not modify the individual, but rather the property attributed to this individual in
the first restrictor? In other words, how is REFERENCE MODIFICATION (cf.
BOLINGER, 1967; HENGEVELD, Forthcoming) as opposed to REFERENT
MODIFICATION16 in (20) represented in FDG? Some examples of reference
modification are given in (21):
16 It should be noted that, contra FDG terminology, the canonical terms referent modification and reference
modification do not pertain to interpersonal, but to representational notions.
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(21) a lousy doctor
a criminal lawyer
a government official
military dress
a civil decoration
Let us consider the last example in detail. A representation analogous to (20)
would incorrectly depict the denotation of civil decoration as a case of referent
modification: an individual such that it has the property decoration, such that it
has the property civil. It means that the entity is civil in addition to being a
decoration, just like in a friendly priest the individual is friendly in addition to
being a priest, which is obviously not the intended denotation. To avoid this,
the representation has to make explicit that xi denotes an individual restricted
by a single complex property that denotes a particular kind of decoration. In
short, civil has to restrict fi, which in turn restricts xi:
(22) xi: [(fi: [decorationN (fi)Ø] : [civilA (fi)Ø]) (xi)Ø]
This representation describes an individual such that the property denoted by
fi is applicable to it, whereby the property fi is restricted by the subsequent
application of decoration and civil. But neither of these properties now have
layer status themselves, which leaves unaccounted for the fact that they may
be referred to independently:
(23) The Légion is not a civil decoration, nor a military one; it encompasses both.17
The same problem turns up in manner expressions, and in further modification
of properties as in a terribly friendly priest. In each case the scope of the modifiers
and the referential potential of the properties show them to be layers in
themselves with their own variable.
What we propose, therefore, is that in line with Keizer (2004, p.11) restrictors
such as friendly and decoration have their own variable and constitute an
embedded layer within the layer fi:
(24) xi: [(fi: [(fj: [decorationN (fj)Ø]) (fi)Ø]: [(fk: [civilA (fk)Ø]) (fi)Ø]) (xi)Ø]
Although this would appear to have solved the non-referentiality of decoration
and civil, it has created a problem of infinite nesting. Namely, as soon as an
additional restrictor is added to fj or fk, the problem of (22) resurfaces: a layer
arises in which separate reference to its constituent elements is impossible.
17 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:L%C3%A9gion_d’honneur
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The only way to solve this would be to add yet another layer for each of its
restrictors, which then suffers from the same problem ad infinitum.
For cases like (24), it may be argued that the problem of infinite nesting is
artificial since languages do not seem to allow further restriction of layers like fj
and fk, and the ambiguity will therefore never arise. However, if we return to
cases in which the first restrictor is internally complex, as in (18) and (19), we
find that the same issue is at stake. But now it can no longer be considered
trivial. In the case of (24) it could still be argued that reference to fj is tantamount
to reference to the primitive decoration and the role of the layer variable as
argument in the restrictor is unproblematic. Yet, in (25) it is obvious that fm
cannot be an argument at the same depth as the lexical arguments China and
Taiwan, since that results in denotational ambiguity. The only ‘licit’ way of solving
this ambiguity is to add another layer in which the nuclear predication is
embedded, at which point we are back at square one: the only ‘innovation’
seems to be an increase in complexity that is not warranted by the structure of
linguistic expressions (26).
(25) (ei: [(fj: [(fm: [(fi: —govern—) (xj: —China—)A (xk: —Taiwan—)U (fm)Ø] (fj)Ø] (ei)Ø])
(26) (ei: [(fj: [(fm: [[(fi: —govern—) (xj: —China—)A (xk: —Taiwan—)U] (fm)Ø] (fj)Ø] (ei)Ø])
What we need, is a principled way to reconcile these two problems, ensuring
full referentiality on the one hand, while avoiding ambiguity and unwarranted
nesting on the other.
7 The role of exocentric layers in extension construal
In recapitulation, considering the arguments and problems presented thus
far we find that:
(27) a. the transparency and simplicity of the LSC is served by reinstating and generalising
the proposal by Dik (1978; 1987), regarding the endocentric predicational structure
of restrictors, for all layers;
b. certain scope ambiguities and referentiality problems which arose because the
nuclear predication / lexical nucleus used not to command a variable can be solved
by invoking an additional f-layer;
c. the addition of such a layer causes new referentiality problems, which necessitate the
addition of a further layer with the same problem, etc. This entails unwarranted nesting.
In this section, we propose a type of layer that can be anaphorically referred to,
thereby resolving the problem pertaining to cases like (26). At the same time,
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the problem in (25) appears to call for a representation in which the variable
does not occur as an argument in its own restrictors, unlike the other layers
discussed so far. The representation of such an EXOCENTRIC layer is given in (28):
(28) αi: [(αh) (α¬i)ϕ]
It is stipulated here that the argument in the restrictor of an exocentric layer
cannot be coreferential with the layer variable. We argue that exocentric layers
serve a special function in the construal of mental extensions: they introduce
lexical primitives, either lexemes or frames, from the Fund into the Formulator.
Before elaborating on the distinction between endocentricity and exocentricity,
we need to be somewhat more specific on what is meant in FDG by lexical
primitives. Following FG, FDG has a strongly lexicalist conception of semantics.
There is no abstract set of language independent semantic primitives. Rather,
the lexical primitives of a specific language “are contained in the lexicon in a form
in which they can actually appear in the expressions” (DIK, 1997, p.23). We take
this to be compatible with our view that the Formulator in individual languages
never (de)composes to a deeper level of semantic granularity than is reflected by
the morphosyntax. Meaning distinctions are treated as lexical if they have no
repercussions for grammatical structure. To take a simplistic example, even though
cat and dog have quite different extensions, the semantic features that distinguish
them (barking ↔ meowing, social ↔ solitary, scavenger ↔ predator, etc.) do not
trigger any differences in grammatical behaviour between the two expressions in
English. Therefore, their differences can be captured in two distinct lexical
primitives, inserted in identical layered structures.
Given this lexicalist view, we take it as highly significant that languages do
not appear to allow for further restriction of layers such as fj and fk in (24) which
are used to introduce the lexical primitives decoration and civil. It appears that
they represent the lowest possible level of semantic decomposition that still
has grammatical relevance. Here, we are dealing with true primitives, to which
no further internal structure should be assigned. To explicate the special status
of primitives, consider example (29):
(29) xi: 
1[( ) (xi)Ø]: 
2[(fj: —fat—) (xi)Ø]: 
3[(fk: —old—) (xi)Ø]
fi: 
4[(fm: —doctor—) (fi)Ø]: 
5[( ) (fi)Ø]
fp: 
6[(—lousy—) (fp)Ø]
‘old fat lousy doctor’


Alfa, São Paulo, 51 (2): 143-164, 2007 159
As we said in section 2, language users construe mental extensions by declaring
an entity of the appropriate type, and then restrict its extension by predicating
characteristics over that entity. This act of predication locates the entity under
construal in a so-called POTENTIAL EXTENSION SET, denoted by an open predication.
This is the set of all potential entities of which that characteristic is the case.18
Multiple potential extension sets can be hierarchically related, forming subsets
and supersets. Potential extension sets can be nested in which case they are
based on a characteristic that is itself again an internally complex
representational entity with its own layered structure.
Figure 1 illustrates the construal of xi in (29). The extension of xi is constrained
by three potential extension sets (1-3). These sets denote all entities to which
the properties fi, fj and fk apply, respectively. Further nesting arises from the fact
that fi has internal complexity: it is a complex property, constrained by two
potential extension sets (4 and 5) which denote all entities to which the properties
fm and fp apply. The latter in turn exhibits internal complexity, and is constrained
by placement in potential extension set 6.
Figure  1 – The construal of old fat lousy doctor
Figure 1 brings out the special status of primitives. Whereas the extension sets
that are used to restrict xi and fi depend themselves on further decomposable
representational entities, this is different for the set that is used to restrict the
extension of fp. For the definition of this set, a primitive (represented by ♦) is
taken from the fund. It is clear that layer status of ♦ within the restrictor of fp is
required, to ensure the possibility of unambiguous reference to that primitive,
should fp be restricted further (as in an astonishingly poor doctor, where
astonishing modifies poor within fp, and fp in turn modifies the property doctor).
However, ♦ is a primitive, and embedding it in an endocentric layer would impose
18 Other potential entities in a potential extension set turn up in cases like a lousy doctori and an excellent
onei, where one construes a second entity in the potential extension set that denotes all entities with the
property doctor.
fp: 
6[♦(fp)Ø]
- ‘fp is in potential extension set 6’
- ‘♦ is a primitive from the Fund’
2[(fj) (αi)Ø]
Formulator
3[(fk) (αi)Ø]
1[(fi) (αi)Ø]
xi: 
1[(fi) (xi)Ø]: 
2[(fj) (xi)Ø]: 
3[(fk) (xi)Ø]
-‘xi is in potential extension sets 1, 2 and 3’
-‘the extension sets have the relation 1 ⊂ 2 ⊂ 3’
4[(fm) (αi)Ø]
5[(fp) (αi)Ø]
fi: 
4[(fm) (fi)Ø]: 
5[(fp) (fi)Ø]
- ‘fi is in potential extension sets 4 and 5’
- ‘the extension sets have the relation 4 ⊂ 5’
6[♦(αi)Ø]
xi
fi fp
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a false sense of decompositionality on poor. Indeed, the essence of an endocentric
layer is that an element is defined in terms of something else, where the essence
of a primitive is that it is not. It follows that primitives must form exocentric
layers, since this does not entail decompositionality.
The question is now whether this approach to lexical primitives also applies
to the other type of primitives: the configurational frames. Does the introduction
of an exocentric layer also solve the problems in (25) and (26)? If we treat
configurational frames in an identical fashion to lexical primitives, we arrive at
an analysis that is strikingly similar to Mackenzie’s (1987) proposal to omit the
layer variable from the closed predication in cases like (18), as is exemplified in (30):
(30) (ei: [(fj: [(fm: [(fi: —govern—) (xj: —China—)A (xk: —Taiwan—)U] (fj)Ø] (ei)Ø])
The difference is that we use it only for the insertion of primitives while retaining
endocentricity for other layers. Uninterpretability of the layer variable as in (25)
and non-referentiality of the layer as in (26) have now been taken care of, but
recall that we noted before how this solution is hard to reconcile with an analysis
in terms of subset restriction. The exocentricity of (18) was problematic since it
obscured the relation between the restrictor and the entity itself and the same
now holds for the relation between fm and the nuclear predication in (30).
This requires a reconsideration of the cognitive status of exocentric layers.
It may be argued that primitives have no mental extensions and hence cannot
be considered entities. After all, a layer that denotes the primitive dog, run or
white does not activate a corresponding mental image: only once the primitive
is used to construe an entity of a specific type (by means of embedding in an
endocentrically restricted layer headed by the appropriate entity variable) does
the individual or property arise. And because primitives do not denote entities
and lack extension, it follows that restriction does not apply to them. Therefore,
we argue that lexical and configurational primitives taken from the fund are
best represented not with a variable, but by means of an indexed ‘placeholder’,
to reflect their lack of extension. To this end, we introduce $i.
19 Furthermore,
since restriction does not apply in the case of primitives, we propose the use of
a new system operator, definition ( | ).20 In the most abstract form, these two
innovations amount to the following representations:
(31) αi: [($m| [(αh) (αg)ϕ]) (αi)ϕ] : …
(32) αi: [($m|♦) (αi)ϕ] : …
19 This is fully compatible with Hengeveld’s (p.c.) suggestion that lemmas in the Fund are assigned an index to
facilitate lexical retrieval, in which case it would coincide with our use of the subscript i.
20 The alternative is to use the colon to represent two qualitatively distinct operations, which would yield a
type of formal inconsistency that is incompatible with the aspirations of the LSC (cf. ANSTEY, 2006, p.70 ff).
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In (31), $m is an exocentric layer that gives a nuclear predication, ‘of αg, it is the
case that αh’. Being a primitive, $m cannot be further restricted within the
Formulator. Next, the definition $m is endocentrically predicated over αi; ‘there
is an entity i of type α, such that $m is the case of αi’. This layer can itself be
restricted further. In (32), we see the insertion of a lexical primitive in an identical
fashion. Configurational and lexical primitives differ only in the sense that they
supply open slots, which are saturated by construing further entities.
To return now to the problem summarised at the start of this section, the
inclusion of an exocentric nuclear predication layer solves the non-referentiality
problem, while at the same time it makes explicit the relation of definition that
exists between the indexed place-holder and the nuclear predication:
(33) (ei: [(fj: [($m| [(fi: —govern—) (xj: —China—)A (xk: —Taiwan—)U] (fj)Ø] (ei)Ø])
The problem of infinite downward recursion is also resolved. Since elements
like $m are primitives taken from the fund, there is a natural stop to the
decomposition that the formulator is capable of. The layers in which $-units are
embedded, all fully conform to the mechanism of restrictors as endocentric
predications.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a number of modifications to the
interpretation and application of the formalism at FDG’s representational level.
We have introduced an additional layer of property restriction to allow for
reference modification, and proposed to apply the square brackets consistently
in line with their interpretation as markers of equipollent relations. More
importantly, we have proposed to treat the insertion of lexical entries, in analogy
to the selection of a predicate-argument frame, not as a restriction operation on
a property, but as an operation of definition. In this way, all primitives taken
from the fund are treated in equal fashion. This introduces exocentric relations
of definition in addition to the established endocentric relations of restriction.
We have argued that the matter of centricity must be viewed separately from
referentiality and layer status. While layer status is required to ensure
referentiality and to interpret scope, the referentiality of a layer does not
automatically make it endocentric. In fact, lexical primitives in this respect are
on a par with elements like phonological strings and syntactic constituents
which, although referential as exemplified in (3), are not decomposable at the
representational level either. Interestingly, aspects of the modifications that we
propose have long been present in FDG theory, and merely needed to be
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amalgamated. Mackenzie (1987) provides the exocentric layer; Dik (1987; 1997)
the predicational shape of restrictors, while Hengeveld (1989) generalises its
endocentricity.
Although the result might appear to add to the complexity of FDG
representations, we believe that it is preferable for four reasons. First, the
proposed use of the square brackets is a fully consistent application of their
theoretical position in FDG. Second, this proposal retains the original logic
underlying the notion of restriction as consisting of the application of a property
to an argument. Third, it nevertheless solves the problem noted in Mackenzie
(1987). And fourth, the result gives an elegant and theoretically correct parallel
between simple and complex heads in representational frames, the former
consisting of just a lexeme, and the latter of a predicate-argument structure.
Most importantly, however, the increased ‘complexity’ is amply compensated
for by the much simpler logic now needed to generate representations in the
formulator. In essence, all representational layers in FDG are now consistently
of one of the following shapes:
(34) a. αi | ♦ lexeme insertion
b. αi | [(αj) (αk)ϕ] lexical predicate frame insertion
c. αi : [(αj) (αi)ϕ] subset restriction of αi
Of these frames only (34c) is generated by the formulator at the representational
level, while the other two layers are taken from the Fund. This adapted formalism
retains the unified applicability of the Layered Structure of the Clause put forward
in Hengeveld (1989), as the same argumentation regarding the nature of
restriction applies in equal measure to domains other than denotation. In Smit
(this volume) the formal implications of the present proposal for the interpersonal
level are explored in more detail. Using a restrictive algorithm that relies on
recurrent combinations of restriction and (endocentric) predication, and a fund
consisting of simplex primitives and composite ones which obey the same
mechanism, we have shown that the full array of denotational complexity can
be accounted for.
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SMIT, N.; VAN STADEN, M. A organização em camadas do nível representacional na
Gramática Discursivo-Funcional. Alfa, São Paulo, v.51, n.2, p.143-164, 2007.
• RESUMO: Este trabalho aborda a estrutura interna de camadas no nível representacional
na Gramática Discursivo-Funcional e propõe três adaptações da representação de
esquemas no que diz respeito à prática vigente (HENGEVELD; MACKENZIE, 2006; no
prelo) O nosso principal interesse é reavaliar a argumentação original de Dik (1989, 1997)
a favor do uso endocêntrico de variáveis de argumento no âmbito dos restritores de termos,
que acreditamos serem fundamentais para a teoria da GDF e deveriam ser generalizadas
para todas as camadas representacionais. Com base nessa pespectiva,  propomos um
uso transparente de colchetes, que delimitem configurações equipolentes das quais a
variável de argumento faz parte. Por sua vez, isto revela problemas na representação da
descrição do evento nuclear – o verbo e seus argumentos – como uma entidade
identificável, que é um antigo problema na GF, e também na representação de modificação
de referência. Como uma solução unificada, nós recorremos a camadas exocêntricas para
explicar as proporiedades estruturais especiais dessas unidades. O resultado é uma
estrutura mais coerente e transparente dos esquemas representacionais na GDF.
• PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Nível representacional; formalismo na Gramática Discursivo
Funcional; restrição; predicação.
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